Dating app entrapment: armed groups using Grindr, Hornet to lure LGBTQ+ Iraqis

In March 2022, Human Rights Watch published a 96-page investigation titled “Everyone Wants Me Dead”: Killings, Abductions, Torture, and Sexual Violence Against LGBT People by Armed Groups in Iraq. The report documented dozens of cases in which armed groups — primarily militias affiliated with state-tolerated armed factions — used dating apps to identify, contact, and physically attack LGBTQ+ individuals.

The pattern

The documented attacks followed a consistent method:

1. Profile creation. Attackers create fake profiles on Grindr, Hornet, Romeo, and similar apps, often using attractive photos taken from other social media.
2. Initial contact. They engage with target users in Iraqi cities — most often Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, and Karbala. Conversations are friendly and may continue for hours, days, or weeks.
3. Meeting arrangement. A meeting is proposed at a private location: an apartment, a hotel room, a remote address.
4. Attack at meeting. When the victim arrives, multiple attackers are present. Outcomes have included beating, kidnapping, sexual violence, extortion, and murder.

HRW documented cases where victims were killed and their bodies dumped publicly with messages claiming the killing was a “moral cleansing.” Other cases involved extortion: victims were filmed in compromising situations and threatened with the footage being sent to family unless they paid.

Who is most at risk

• Users in southern Iraq and Baghdad with militia presence.
• Users of public profiles — those with face photos, real ages, real names, or personal details visible.
• Users meeting strangers in person, especially at private locations (apartments, hotels) rather than public spaces.
• Trans women, who have been disproportionately targeted in the documented cases.

Risk has increased since Law 14

The April 2024 criminalization law means that even if police discover an attack, victims face their own criminal exposure for the same-sex contact that led to the trap. Many victims do not report. Attackers know this and act accordingly.

How to reduce risk

If you choose to use dating apps inside Iraq, harm-reduction practices that have helped others:

1. Never use real face photos on public profiles. Even partial or angled photos that look anonymous can be reverse-image-searched against your other social media.
2. Never use real name, real age, or real city in a profile. Even “Baghdad” alone is enough to narrow a target.
3. Use a clean device. Run dating apps on a separate phone or a cleanly wiped account, not your personal phone with all your real-identity apps and accounts.
4. Always use a VPN. Mullvad and Proton VPN are the most trusted free options. The VPN should be on before the dating app loads, every time.
5. Don’t meet at private locations on first contact. A coffee shop in a busy area gives you escape options. An apartment does not.
6. Verify the person. Ask for a photo holding a piece of paper with the current time written on it. Most attackers won’t comply or will send obvious composite/old photos.
7. Tell a friend. Before you meet anyone from an app, send a trusted person the username, profile, screenshots, planned location, and time. If you don’t message them after the meeting, they know to act.
8. If something feels wrong, leave. Trust your gut. The cost of canceling a date is zero. The cost of the alternative is documented in the HRW report.

For more detailed safety guidance, see Digital Safety and the FAQ.

If you have been a victim

You are not alone. Even if reporting to Iraqi authorities is unsafe, you can:

• Reach out to us via the community page — we can sometimes connect you with international advocacy contacts.
• Document what happened with timestamps and screenshots if you can do so safely.
• If you have urgent physical safety needs, the honor violence guide covers go-bag preparation and emergency exits.